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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DAVID E. HOWARD, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
TOWN OF NORTH SALT LAKE, a 
municipal corporation of the State of 
Utah, Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8697 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Since appeal was perfected in this case the respondent 
David E. Howard has died. It is believed that this fact does 
not affect the disposition of the appeal. The death is, how-
ever, suggested upon the record pursuant to Rule 25, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This case involves a proceeding for the restriction of 
the corporate limits of the appellant Town of North Salt 
Lake taken under the provisions of Chapter 4, Title 10, 
U. C. A. 1953. The appellant Town of North Salt Lake will 
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be designated herein as the "Town". Respondents are real 
property owners whose premises were disconnected from 
the Town by decree of the trial court. They will be desig-
nated herein as "Respondents". Emphasis has been sup-
plied. 
The action was instituted July 15, 1955 by petition of 
the Respondents. Two causes of action are included in the 
petition. The first asserts the invalidity of an annexation 
ordinance enacted by the Town on April 21, 1952. The 
second prays that in the event the said ordinance is sus-
tained, the territory particularly described be disconnected 
from the Town for the reasons set forth in the petition. 
The court below sustained the validity of the annexa-
tion ordinance. Under the second cause of action it made 
detailed findings wherein, pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 10-4-2, U. C. A. 1953, it found the allegations of the 
petition to be true and that justice and equity required the 
disconnection of the territory involved. Decree of discon-
nection was thereafter entered pursuant to the provisions 
of said Chapter 4, Title 10. 
The only issue presented on this appeal is whether 
justice and equity require the disconnection. The Town 
does not object to the findings of the trial court or assert 
that such findings are not supported by the evidence. The 
question presented should therefore be determined from a 
consideration of the facts involved in the light of recognized 
principles of justice and equity applicable under the con-
trolling statute. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We deem it essential to a proper disposition of this 
case that the facts be fully presented. Because we believe 
the brief of appellant does not do so we will undertake to 
set forth concisely all essential facts. In order to assist the 
court we have also attached to this brief two maps, Exhibit 
1, showing the Town area prior to the annexation of April 
21, 1952, and the area covered by such annexation, and 
Exhibit 2, showing the area of the Town after disconnec-
tion and the area disconnected by the decree of the trial 
court. The Town has, since 1952, annexed certain additional 
small areas of territory lying upon its easterly borders 
which are not shown by these maps but which we believe 
to be immaterial in the disposition of this case. 
The record here is voluminous and difficult to follow 
because of the order in which the evidence oral and docu-
mentary was introduced. On the issue presented on this 
appeal there is, however, no serious dispute of the facts. 
The trial court found upon all of the essential facts, which 
findings are not here objected to by the Town. Record 
references will therefore for the most part be to the find-
ings of the court below. References to the Clerk's files will 
be designated as "R." and to the transcript of the evidence 
as "T. R." 
The Town was organized in 1946. In 1950 it had a 
population of some 255 persons. Its population at the time 
of trial was estimated at approximately 1150 persons. At 
the time of organization the Town embraced an area of 
approximately 480 acres which extended along the main 
highway between Salt Lake City and Ogden, the southerly 
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boundary line of the Town being common with the northerly 
boundary line of Salt Lake City. On April 21, 1952, the 
Town enacted an ordinance of annexation whereby there 
was brought into the Town an area substantially in excess 
of 3440, acres including the territory here involved (R. 
115-116). 
Under the annexation of April, 1952, certain parcels 
of land owned by Cudahy Packing Company, Salt Lake 
Stock Yards, Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder 
Company were excluded from the Town, forming an island 
in the center of the territory involved embracing approxi-
mately 280 acres. This island area is likewise shown upon 
the maps attached to this brief. The reasons which led the 
Town to exclude the island area at the time of the annexa-
tion of the surrounding area are not disclosed (R. 115-116). 
The effect upon the Powder Companies in creating such 
island was to exclude the properties of Hercules and Atlas 
from the Town while the properties of Illinois and Columbia 
in the same area were annexed (T. R. 400-407). 
In August, 1952, the respondent Howard and others 
filed a petition in the District Court of Davis County, seek-
ing disconnection from the Town of a portion of the terri-
tory annexed by the ordinance of April 21, 1952. Proceed-
ings were taken pursuant to that petition and the District 
Court entered a decree of disconnection in accordance with 
the petition (R. 109-110). Thereafter, appeal was taken 
by the Town to this court wherein two questions were pre-
sented, namely, (1) did the requisite number of real prop-
erty owners join in the petition for disconnection, and (2) 
did justice and equity require the disconnection. This court 
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held against the petitioners on the first question and reversed. 
The second question was not determined on the appeal. 
Howard v. North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P. 2d 216 
(1955). In July, 1955, respondents filed a second petition 
resulting in the judgment from which this appeal is taken. 
By reference to the maps attached to this brief and 
the large maps, plaintiffs' Exhibits A, B, C and D, it is 
seen that the Town area as it was constituted after the 
annexation of April 21, 1952, is bisected by the railroad 
tracks of the Union Pacific and the Rio Grande. The tracks 
of Rio Grande roughly divide the character of land in the 
general area. Westerly of these tracks and extending to the 
Jordan River the land is largely low, flat and swampy. 
Easterly of these tracks the land slopes up to the Wasatch 
Mountains. In this brief the easterly area will sometimes 
be referred to as the upland, and the westerly area as the 
low land (R. 115-116). 
As will be seen from the attached maps and said Ex-
hibits A, B, C and D, the southerly portion of the low land 
was disconnected by the decree of the court below. The 
disconnected territory embraces approximately 1300 acres. 
It is bounded on the south by Salt Lake City and Salt Lake 
County, on the east by the original westerly line of the 
Town, on the west by the Jordan River, and on the north 
by the line indicated on these maps. The disconnected terri-
tory has the same general physical characteristics as the 
remainder of the low land. Near the Rio Grande tracks is 
an area suitable for farming. The remainder of the area, 
extending out to the Jordan River, is flat with high water 
tables and may be covered in part with water in late winter 
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or early spring. The disconnected territory as shown by 
the aerial photograph, plaintiffs' Exhibit D, is cut through 
with open and closed sewer lines and drainage ditches which 
have been in operation for many years. Apart from the area 
near the Rio Grande tracks, which is used for farming, the 
remainder of the area so far as agricultural uses extend, 
is suitable only for grazing purposes and has been so used 
for many years by Bountiful Livestock Company. Adjoin-
ing the disconnected territory on the north is the Cudahy 
Packing and Stock Yards area, which was excluded by the 
annexation of April 21, 1952 (R. 115-116, 119). 
The upland area is characterized by good drainage, and 
soil suitable for homes, business and industrial establish-
ments. It is now being used for these purposes. Within the 
upland area practically all of the dwellings of the entire 
Town are located (R. 115, 119-120, T. R. 1028-1044). 
The disconnected territory at the time of trial was 
owned by sixteen parties, all of whom joined in the petition 
for severance, the principal owners being the respondent 
Howard, Bountiful Livestock Company, Salt Lake City, 
Portland Cement Company, Salt Lake Refining Company, 
Salt Lake Pipe Line Company, Standard Oil Company of 
California, Illinois Powder Company and Columbia Pow-
der Company (R. 117-119). 
There are no homes whatever upon the disconnected 
territory and no persons reside thereon. Western States 
Refining Company as seen by plaintiffs' Exhibit D has 
three oil storage tanks upon the disconnected territory, its 
plant and other facilities being within the Town. The oil 
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refinery of Salt Lake Refining Company and its adminis-
trative offices together with certain structures and facili-
ties of Salt Lake Pipe Line Company and Standard Oil 
Company of California are all located on the disconnected 
territory. Salt Lake Refining Company and Salt Lake Pipe 
Line Company are subsidiaries of Standard Oil Company 
of California. The Refining Company is engaged in the 
operation of a large modern oil refinery and Salt Lake Pipe 
Line Company is a carrier of petroleum and its products 
by pipeline from points in Colorado to the refinery site and 
from the refinery site to points and places in Idaho, Oregon 
and Washington. Columbia Powder Company and Illinois 
Powder Company have powder storage magazines located 
on the northerly part of the disconnected territory. These 
magazines must, of necessity, be located in isolated areas 
removed from any other structures and have been located 
by these companies and their predecessors and other com-
panies in the general area for many years. Except for the 
structures indicated, there are no buildings whatever upon 
the disconnected territory, and this area except as a small 
part thereof is occupied by the structures indicated, is flat, 
swampy bottom land no different in essential character-
istics today than it was fifty or more years ago. The upland 
area, on the other hand, has been used for homesites ever 
since the settlement of the general community and is being 
built upon with homes, and business and industrial estab-
lishments and the population increase which has occurred 
during the period since the organization of the Town has 
taken place entirely upon the upland area (R. 120-122, T. 
R. 757-768, 1028-1041). 
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There are no sidewalks, curbs or gutters within the 
disconnected territory. No part thereof has ever been 
platted or subdivided for residential development. Two 
principal highways traverse the area. An extension of 
Redwood Road, sometimes referred to as the "Industrial 
Highway" extends across the area in a generally northerly 
and southerly direction. This is a state highway maintained 
by the Utah State Road Commission. Near the northerly 
side of the area is an east and west road known as "Cudahy 
Lane". This road crosses the Industrial Highway. From 
the point of such crossing westerly to the Jordan River 
the road is graveled. From the point of such crossing east-
erly to U. S. Highway 91, it is hard surfaced. Within the 
disconnected territory Cudahy Lane is maintained entirely 
at the expense and with the equipment and manpower of 
Davis County. A secondary road known as the "St. Joseph 
Farm Road" extends from U. S. Highway 91 westerly to a 
point where the sewer conduit of Salt Lake City is dis-
charged into the open sewer canal. Within the area involved 
this road is unsurfaced. It is used by Salt Lake City in 
connection with the inspection of its sewer canal and to a 
limited extent by Salt Lake Refining Company and by Salt 
Lake Pipe Line Company and its employees. The appellant 
Town owns no road building or maintaining equipment and 
employs the equipment of Davis County or the State Road 
Commission for the maintenance of streets within the 
Town (R. 122). 
Prior to 1948, there had for many years been no sig-
nificant change or development in the use of the discon-
nected territory. It was then used for farming and grazing 
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purposes and the storage of explosives in powder magazines. 
In 1948, Standard Oil Company of California determined to 
establish an oil refinery in the Salt Lake area, and its sub-
sidiary Salt Lake Refining Company acquired for that pur-
pose a tract of land embracing approximately 588 acres in 
one contiguous parcel, about 468 acres of which is located 
within the disconnected territory, the remainder being in 
adjoining Salt Lake City. Portions of this tract have been 
conveyed to and are now owned by Salt Lake Pipe Line 
Company and Standard Oil Company of California. These 
three companies constitute the principal industrial enter-
prises within the disconnected territory. Their plants and 
facilities are located near the easterly side of such territory 
in proximity to the trackage of The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company. Salt Lake Refining Company, 
in connection with the construction of its oil refinery and 
in order to gain access to its premises, at its own expense 
constructed a hard-surfaced road leading from the public 
streets of Salt Lake City northerly to its administration 
buildings and refinery plant. This road is maintained en-
tirely at the expense of this Company and constitutes the 
principal public access to its premises (R. 122-123). 
The matter of an adequate water supply is of utmost 
importance in the operation of a modern oil refinery. Large 
quantities of water are consumed in oil refining operations 
and an adequate supply and sufficient pressures are essen-
tial for fire protection purposes. Immediately following 
the establishment of said plant site, Salt Lake Refining 
Company undertook to investigate and determine the sources 
of water supply which might be available to it in connec-
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tion with its refinery operations. Consideration was given 
to obtaining this supply from underground sources which 
proved to be unsatisfactory in quality and insufficient in 
quantity. Consideration was also given to obtaining a water 
supply from the Jordan River but this was determined to 
be unfeasible at that time. This industry then considered 
and is still considering the possibility of obtaining a water 
supply from treated sewage if and when Salt Lake City 
constructs sewage treatment plants, but no water is pres-
ently being obtained from this source. Salt Lake Refining 
Company determined that the only feasible source of water 
supply available in 1948 was from Salt Lake City. Arrange-
ments were initially made in 1948 with Salt Lake City look-
ing to the obtaining of a supply of water in a volume of 
approximately 150 gallons per minute which was projected 
to increase to a volume in a range of 300 to 500 gallons per 
minute in three years. Arrangements were made whereby 
the Refining Company advanced the funds to Salt Lake 
City for the construction of a single water main to its prop-
erty in Salt Lake City and at a later date further funds 
were advanced by the Refining Company to Salt Lake City 
whereby another water main was constructed enabling the 
Refining Company to have a water supply furnished 
through separate mains which would insure a water supply 
through one main in the event the other might fail. The 
expenditures made by the Refining Company to insure 
water supply from Salt Lake City are in the amount of 
approximately $150,000. That portion of this expenditure 
which was advanced to Salt Lake City for the construction 
of mains within its streets and outside the Refinery prop-
erty was repaid to the Refining Company by crediting its 
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water bills. The water demands of the Refining Company 
and its water consumption from Salt Lake City are now in 
the range of 1,000 gallons per minute. The Refining Com-
pany expects within a period of five years that its water 
requirements will approximately double the present con-
sumption. The water supply which is being furnished to 
Salt Lake Refining Company from Salt Lake City is pur-
suant to arrangements whereby Salt Lake City may term-
inate such service if the requirements of its inhabitants 
are such that insufficient water is available for the needs 
of such inhabitants. In order to protect itself against the 
eventuality that Salt Lake City may be unable to furnish 
a sufficient water supply, Salt Lake Refining Company has 
entered into firm contracts with Weber Basin Water Con-
servancy District for 700 acre feet per year of treated in-
dustrial water, 2000 acre feet per year of untreated indus-
trial water and 400 acre feet per year of irrigation water. 
The Refining Company will be obligated to pay said Con-
servancy District approximately $95,000 per year under 
these commitments whether or not the Refining Company 
uses any water whatever thereunder. The commitments of 
Salt Lake Refining Company to the Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District are probably the largest commitments 
made to that District by any industrial concern within Davis 
County. None of the property owners of the disconnected 
territory other than the Standard Oil Company affiliates 
presently require a water supply, other than that available 
on their respective premises (R. 123-125). Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District is empowered to sell water to 
other industries in the disconnected territory should such 
water be required ( T. R. 1233) . 
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While Salt Lake Refining Company was engaged in 
providing its water supply, the Town was undertaking to 
provide water for its inhabitants in the upland area. The 
Town was organized for that purpose. To this end the 
Town acquired the water from certain small springs located 
in Salt Lake City and has drilled two wells within the up-
land area. From these sources the Town now has sufficient 
water supply to satisfy the requirements of the upland 
area with some additional capacity for future growth, but 
could not now supply the requirements of Salt Lake Refin-
ing Company. No water is being furnished by the Town 
to any industry or person within the disconnected territory. 
No request has been made for such water by any owner 
within the disconnected territory and no extension of mains 
has been made into this area by the Town (R. 125, T. R. 
987). 
The danger of fire is one of the greatest hazards en-
countered in connection with the operation of a modern oil 
refinery. Salt Lake Refining Company has made provision 
for fire protection within its refinery area by the construc-
tion of water storage facilities consisting of a steel tank 
and cooling tower basins having a capacity in excess of one 
million gallons, water mains and hydrants throughout the 
Refinery, pumps for the creation of pressure and by the 
purchase and maintenance of fire fighting equipment con-
sisting of a fire engine, foam powder, some 5,000 feet of 
211~ inch fire hose and smaller first-aid hoses throughout 
the Refinery (R. 126-127). 
In addition to providing this equipment, Salt Lake 
Refining Company carries on a regular and well disciplined 
training program among its employees for fighting refinery 
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fires. This program of training is conducted for the reason 
that refinery fires are different from fires of ordinary 
combustible material and must be treated and combated in 
accordance with well recognized methods of fighting such 
fires (R. 126-127). 
The Town has no fire fighting facilities. Fire protec-
tion from public facilities in the south Davis County area 
is furnished by the Davis County Fire Department. The 
Town pays Davis County a stipulated sum for each occasion 
on which it is summoned to fight a fire within the limits 
of the Town. The equipment and personnel of the Davis 
County Fire Department would normally not be of substan-
tial assistance in combating a fire within an oil refinery. 
Several fires have occurred within the Salt Lake Refinery 
premises which have been handled by the equipment of 
Salt Lake Refining Company. Some fires have occurred 
within the disconnected territory outside such Refinery 
premises for which calls have been made and answered by 
the Davis County Fire Department. The Town has not pro-
vided either personnel or equipment for the fighting of 
such fires, and renders no fire protection to the disconnected 
territory (R. 126-127). In June of 1954, the Town author-
ized a bond issue of $15,000.00 for a fire department, but 
the bonds were never sold (T. R. 992). 
The Town maintains a Marshal who works one shift 
per day and who employs an assistant during certain per-
iods. The duties and activities of this Marshal relate pri-
marily to the policing of traffic on U. S. Highway 91 and 
the protection of business establishments and dwellings of 
the Town which are located in the area along or near this 
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highway and easterly of the tracks of Rio Grande. The 
Marshal makes one trip per shift along Cudahy Lane and 
the Industrial Highway. The Industrial Highway is, how-
ever, regularly patrolled by the Utah State Highway Patrol 
(R. 127-128, T. R. 1004). In May or June, 1955, the Marshal 
was called by the Sheriff of Davis County to assist in connec-
tion with an incident when a shot was fired through a win-
dow at Salt Lake Refining Company. There is no evidence 
that any officer of the Town has, except for this incident, 
ever been within the Refinery premises (T. R. 1127, 825-
826) . The only arrests made by a police officer of the Town 
within the disconnected territory have been in connection 
with the issuance of traffic tickets on the Industrial High-
way or Redwood Road (T. R. 1007). The Marshal does not 
do any patrolling within the refinery area of Salt Lake 
Refining Company. This area is under fence and the Com-
pany maintains guards at its gates to supervise the en-
trance and discharge of all persons into the Refining area 
(R. 127-128). The Marshal does some patrolling around 
the powder magazines of the powder companies herein re-
ferred to. However, such companies have never requested 
any police protection from the Town and these magazines 
are kept locked and are in an open area necessarily removed 
from any other structures. 
The Town has garbage collection for homes and busi-
ness establishments within the upland area. The Town does 
not, however, conduct any garbage collection and never has 
conducted garbage collection within the disconnected terri-
tory. Salt Lake Refining Company at its expense engages 
the services of a waste paper disposal company which re-
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moves garbage from the Refinery area and hauls the same 
to the Salt Lake City Dump (T. R. 826). 
The Town has a post office and a postmaster. This 
post office is located outside the disconnected territory 
easterly of the plant of Cudahy Packing Company. People 
in surrounding communities use this post office. One of 
the three largest customers of the post office is the Cudahy 
Packing Plant which, as above shown, was excluded by the 
Town and is not within its boundaries. In addition to the 
Cudahy Packing Plant, concerns who have their offices in 
the Stock Yards building and the Stock Yards area, like-
wise outside of the boundaries of the Town, are extensive 
users of the post office. On the other hand, none of the 
industrial concerns whose plants are located within the 
disconnected area make any use whatever of this post office. 
Their mail is obtained at the Salt Lake City Post Office 
(R. 131, T. R. 830, 907-908). 
There is evidence in the record that a bank has been 
established within the limits of the Town. This bank is 
located east of U. S. Highway 91 within the upland area, 
and wholly outside the disconnected territory. It serves 
people residing within this upland area of the Town and 
adjacent unincorporated areas. There is no evidence that 
the industrial concerns or any of the owners within the 
disconnected territory use or employ these banking facili-
ties (T. R. 1148-51). 
There is a suggestion in appellant's brief that residents 
of the Town have been offered a sewage disposal system. 
The fact is that in 1955 bonds for a sewer system were 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
authorized. In August, 1956, Templeton and Linke, an 
engineering firm employed by the Town, issued a report 
respecting a proposed sewer system. It was introduced in 
evidence as defendant's Exhibit 16. None of the bonds have 
been sold and no construction of any such system has been 
undertaken (defendant's Exhibit 16). 
Appellant states that the residents of the area are 
benefited by services of the Town in mosquito abatement. 
In the years 1953 and 1954 the Town appears to have ex-
pended for that purpose respectively the sums of $158.27 
and $454.67. There is no evidence that these expenditures 
were made within the disconnected territory. No funds for 
that purpose have been expended by the Town since that 
period (Defendant's Exhibit 18, Page 3). The reason for 
the termination of such expenditures is that mosquito abate-
ment in the area has, since 1954, and now is being carried 
on by another governmental agency, namely, the Davis 
County Mosquito Abatement District, and this function is 
no longer performed by the Town (T. R. 1143-1144). 
The Town has a small recreational area located in the 
upland area entirely outside the disconnected territory. As 
herein shown, however, there are no dwellings within the 
disconnected territory, and no persons whatever reside 
therein. There were at the time of trial 277 persons em-
ployed within the disconnected territory. They were work-
ing at the Salt Lake Refining Company and Salt Lake Pipe 
Line Company. Of these 277 employees, only 2 resided 
within the corporate limits of the Town (R. 130). 
Based on 1956 tax valuations, after severance from 
the Town of the disconnected territory, 78.61% of the 
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assessed valuations within the remainder of the Town area 
would be made up of industrial, commercial and public 
utility properties (Plaintiffs' Exhibit II). This is the high-
est percentage which such properties bear to total assessed 
valuation in any city or town in Davis County. The next 
highest percentage which such properties bear to total 
assessed valuation is found in the town of West Bountiful, 
where the percentage is 77.73% (Plaintiffs' Exhibit KK). 
The average of all of the cities and towns in Davis County 
for the year 1956 shows that industrial, commercial and 
public utility properties constitute 42.86% of the assessed 
valuations of such municipalities (Plaintiffs' Exhibit KK). 
If the appellant Town were to lose the assessed valuation 
of all the property involved in this disconnection it would 
be in a better position with respect to the balance between 
residential and other classes of property than any other 
city or town in Davis County (Plaintiffs' Exhibits II and 
KK). If the area disconnected is retained in the Town, 
based on 1956 valuations, 94.23% of its assessed valuation 
would be made up of industrial, commercial and public util-
ity properties (Plaintiffs' Exhibit KK). If there were no 
disconnection of the territory involved, again based on 1956 
valuations, this territory would be paying 61.86% of all of 
the ad valorem taxes imposed by the Town (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit HH). 
As herein shown, the disconnected territory is cut 
through with sewer lines both open and closed, an oily sewer 
canal which comes from the railroad and oil refining areas 
in Salt Lake City, and an open drainage ditch leading from 
the Stock Yards and Cudahy Packing Company area. There 
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is some evidence in the record that Salt Lake Refining Com-
pany discharges fumes and odors into the atmosphere in 
the Town area. This Refinery is but one of four oil refin-
eries in the general Salt Lake industrial area. The open 
sewer canal of Salt Lake City is a source of unpleasant 
odors in the Town area. It is conceded that inasmuch as 
Salt Lake City is going forward with its program for the 
construction of a sewer disposal plant that it would not 
be economically feasible to enclose this open sewer in a 
conduit and the defendant Town has so agreed with Salt 
Lake City (T. R. 1167). The packing plant of Cudahy Pack-
ing Company and the Stock Yards area and the slough near 
the Cudahy Packing Plant and the open drain ditches lead-
ing from those areas likewise discharge fumes and odors 
into the atmosphere. With respect to the Cudahy Ditch, 
the Town Clerk in her testimony stated that: "The Cudahy 
Ditch is really as bad if not worse than the sewer ditch" 
(T. R. 1167). The situation with respect to the general pack-
ing plant and stock yards area is best described in the 
words of counsel for the Town where he observed: "That's 
a pretty stinking place all the way around there" (T. R.1190-
91). This is the area which the Town, in the annexation 
of April 21, 1952, elected to exclude from its boundaries. 
The disconnected territory was zoned "Industrial" by the 
Town. It is zoned in the same classification by Davis 
County (R. 121). 
Under the foregoing state of facts, the trial court found 
that justice and equity required the severance from the 
Town of the disconnected territory. We believe this result 
is compelled by application of the principles which we shall 
hereafter consider. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE 
TERRITORY INVOLVED BE DISCONNECTED 
FROM THE TOWN. 
(a) Oral Expressions or Opinions of the Trial 
Court Are Not a Part of Its Decision. The 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment Alone 
Are Looked To in Determining What the 
Court Below Decided. 
(b) No Direct or Special Benefit Was Received 
by the Disconnected Area Resulting From 
the Exercise of the Powers of the Town. 
(c) The Future Growth and Expansion of the 
Town Will Not Require the Disconnected Ter-
ritory Nor Is It Necessary for the Use of the 
Town. 
(d) There Is No Interrelation or Dependency Be-
tween the Disconnected Territory and the 
Town. 
(e) The Health and Welfare of the Residents of 
the Town Do Not Require that the Discon-
nected Territory Remain a Part of the Town. 
(f) The Decided Cases Sustain the Disconnection. 
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JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE 
TERRITORY INVOLVED BE DISCONNECTED 
FROM THE TOWN. 
(a) Oral Expressions or Opinions of the Trial 
Court Are Not a Part of Its Decision. The 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment Alone 
Are Looked To in Determining What the 
Court Below Decided. 
The Town in its brief sets forth in full the remarks of 
the trial court made at the conclusion of the evidence and 
the arguments of counsel. The detailed findings and con-
clusions thereafter entered by the trial court are not con-
sidered or objected to in appellant's brief. The brief ap-
pears to assume that such remarks constitute the decision 
of the trial court. The law is otherwise. Rule 52 (a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that in all actions 
tried upon the facts without a jury the decision of the trial 
court shall be embodied in its findings and conclusions. The 
code provision from which the rule was adopted was to the 
same effect. The findings and conclusions form the basis 
of the judgment or decision. The observations of the court 
at the conclusion of the trial or an opinion, if one be filed, 
are not a part of the judgment or decision. See Fictor Min-
ing Co. v. National Bank, 18 Utah 87, 55 Pac. 72. 
While the remarks or opinion of the trial court may 
sometimes be observed to ascertain the reason for a deci-
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sian they may not be looked at to determine what such court 
found or decided. The findings, conclusions and judgment 
of the trial court must be examined in making that determ-
ination. This court has repeatedly so held. See Grand Cen-
tral Mining Co. v. Mammoth Mining Co., 29 Utah 490, 83 
Pac. 648; Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Fox, 44 Utah 
323, 140 Pac. 660; Miller v. Marks, 46 Utah 257, 148 Pac. 
412; Headlund v. Daniels, 50 Utah 381, 167 Pac. 1170; Stev-
ens & Wallis v. Golden Porphyry Mines Co., 81 Utah 414, 
18 P. 2d 903; Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 P. 
2d 665; and Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 
264. 
In pointing out the foregoing principles, we do not 
mean to suggest that the oral observations of the court 
quoted in appellant's brief are erroneous or in any manner 
prejudicial. We simply desire to focus attention upon the 
proposition that if there were error in the judgment ap-
pealed from we must look to the findings, conclusions and 
judgment to find such error and not to the oral observations 
which were made by the court below at the conclusion of 
the evidence and the arguments of counsel. 
(b) No Direct or Special Benefit Was Received 
by the Disconnected Area Resulting From 
the Exercise of the Powers of the Town. 
It is at the outset, an elementary general proposition 
that in the exercise of municipal powers some substantial 
direct or special benefit must be conferred upon territory 
within a town. Otherwise it is upon principle unjust and 
inequitable that property within such territory should be 
burdened with the taxes imposed by the municipality. 
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Cities and towns are granted certain powers by the 
legislature. Through the exercise of these powers they are 
enabled to confer certain direct or special benefits upon 
territory within their corporate limits. It is the conferring 
of these benefits which must ultimately justify or require 
the inclusion of territory within a town. 
If these benefits are not substantially conferred then 
general principles of justice and equity require that the 
territory be relieved of the burdens imposed by the town. 
The special benefits which a city or town may confer upon 
territory within its limits relate to such matters as roads, 
sidewalks, curbs and gutters, sewage facilities, water sup-
ply, police protection and fire protection. 
Applying these principles to the facts in this case it 
is seen that no direct or special benefits of any substantial 
character were at the time of trial being conferred upon 
the disconnected territory by the Town. At the risk of 
redundancy these facts may be summarized as follows: 
There are no homes or public buildings within the dis-
connected territory. No person resides therein. No part 
of the area is platted for residential purposes and it is un-
likely that any such development will occur within the fore-
seeable future. All residential development is occurring in 
the upland area. There are no curbs, gutters or sidewalks 
in the disconnected territory. The streets within the area 
are maintained by Davis County, the State Road Commis .. 
sion, and in the case of Salt Lake Refining Company by 
this industry at its own expense. The Town has no street 
maintenance equipment. 
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The Town does not furnish any water supply what-
ever to the disconnected territory. None of its mains or 
facilities are constructed within such territory and the 
Town has not undertaken or offered to render any such 
service. It presently does not have capacity to provide water 
for Salt Lake Refining Company. On the other hand, this 
industry has at enormous expense undertaken to procure 
its own water supply both from Salt Lake City and Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District. Other property owners 
in the disconnected territory do not require water supply 
other than that available on their own premises, although 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District is empowered to 
furnish water within the disconnected territory. 
The Town has no fire fighting equipment. It procures 
fire protection from Davis County. Salt Lake Refining 
Company has provided its own fire protection fighting 
facilities. If other property owners in the disconnected 
territory require fire protection it can be secured directly 
from Davis County. 
Police protection service rendered by the Town is lim-
ited to highway patrol and issuing of traffic tickets within 
the disconnected territory. The Industrial Highway is the 
principal highway through the area. It is regularly pa-
trolled by the State Highway Patrol. Salt Lake Refining 
Company provides its own guard service within its prem-
ises. Police protection to the disconnected territory is avail-
able from the County Sheriff of Davis County. No property 
owner within the territory has requested police protection 
from the Town. 
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The Town collects no garbage within the disconnected 
territory. Salt Lake Refining Company at its own expense 
engages an independent garbage collection service. No 
other property owner in the area requires garbage collec-
tion. 
A post office is located in the Town outside the dis-
connected territory. Property owners whose plants are 
located within the disconnected territory do not use such 
post office. On the other hand, Cudahy Packing Company 
whose plant area was excluded by the Town by the annexa-
tion is one of the three largest users of this post office and 
companies whose offices are also within such excluded area 
are likewise substantial users of this post office. 
A bank has been located within the area. This is a 
private enterprise, not a municipal function. The Town 
could not perform this function or grant or deny the right 
of the bank to do so. The location of this bank does not 
appear to be a material fact here. Even if it were, there 
is no evidence that it serves any property owner within 
the disconnected territory. 
The Town is not engaged in mosquito abatement. That 
function is now being discharged by another governmental 
agency. The Town has undertaken studies for a system of 
sewage disposal but now has no such system. 
Under these facts, how can a serious contention be 
made that direct or special benefits of any substance have 
been conferred by the Town upon the disconnected territory. 
(c) The Future Growth and Expansion of the 
Town vVill Not Require the Disconnected Ter-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
ritory Nor Is It Necessary for the Use of the 
Town. 
The principle has sometimes been stated that territory 
should not be disconnected from a municipality if it is nec-
essary for the future growth of such municipality. 
In its findings (R. 128-130) the trial court found that 
the growth and expansion of the Town did not require the 
disconnected territory and that the same was not necessary 
for the use of the Town. 
This finding is not assailed in the brief of the Town 
and it is supported by the evidence. 
The physical facts alone are sufficient to demonstrate 
this proposition. Here involved is an area of some 1300 
acres lying at the very back door of Salt Lake City. Yet 
in more than one hundred years after the settlement of the 
surrounding communities there is not a single home or 
dwelling located upon the disconnected territory. The only 
structures whatever within this territory are the facilities 
of the oil companies and the magazines of Illinois and 
Columbia Powder. The witness Kiepe, a professional real 
estate appraiser, in his testimony explained why this low, 
swampy area had not developed and demonstrated that the 
logical area for the development and expansion of residen-
tial construction lay in the upland territory (T. R. 1043). 
Giving consideration to possible industrial expansion 
the evidence shows that the industrial concerns which, 
during the post-war period, have established plants in the 
general area in question have located upon or adjacent to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
railroad trackage. The disconnected territory is owned 
primarily by Salt Lake City, Bountiful Livestock Company, 
Portland Cement Company and Salt Lake Refining Com-
pany. There is no evidence that any of these ownerships 
will change within the foreseeable future and if further 
industrial expansion occurs in the area embraced within 
the corporate limits of the Town, the aerial photograph 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit D) clearly demonstrates that there is 
ample area for such expansion northerly of the island area 
and along and near the tracks of Rio Grande and Union 
Pacific, and other evidence is to the same effect (T. R. 1036-
1040). 
It therefore appears quite clear that the future growth 
and expansion of the Town will not require the disconnected 
territory either for residential or industrial purposes. 
(d) There Is No Interrelation or Dependency Be-
tween the Disconnected Territory and the 
Town. 
A disposition of this point requires an examination of 
the Utah case of In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., et al., 
71 Utah 430, 266 Pac. 1044 (1926), cited in the brief of 
the Town. 
In that case petitioner sought disconnection from 
Mammoth City of an area of territory. Disconnection was 
decreed by the trial court. On appeal this court, in a divided 
opinion, reversed except as to a small area in the west part 
of the Town. 
On the facts the case is readily distinguished from the 
one at bar. In the Mammoth City case the area involved was 
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a part of the town upon its incorporation and had at all 
times been within the town prior to the commencement of 
the disconnection proceedings. Mammoth City was a mining 
town. The court found that if there were no mines oper-
ated in the immediate vicinity the town would never have 
existed. The municipality was organized for the sole pur-
pose of providing homes for those who worked in and 
about the mines located within the city and other mines 
in the vicinity. A large percentage of the men residing in 
Mammoth City were employees of the mines located within 
the boundaries of the city. The mines located within the 
boundaries of Mammoth City and the municipality itself 
were entirely tied up together. 
In the instant case, the development of the Town and 
that of the disconnected territory have each been indepen-
dent of the other. The disconnected territory was not made 
a part of the Town upon its organization in 1946, but was 
annexed by the ordinance of April 21, 1952. This annexa-
tion precipitated the litigation which has been in progress 
ever since that time. The Town was organized primarily 
for the purpose of providing its inhabitants with a water 
supply and substantially all of the expenditures made by 
the Town have been for that purpose (Defendant's Exhibit 
16, Page 7). But no part of such expenditures have been 
made within the disconnected territory and no part of such 
water supply has been furnished to such territory. 
While the Town was procuring its water supply, Salt 
Lake Refining Company, the principal industry of the area, 
was doing likewise. Substantial expenditures were made 
by this Company to procure water from Salt Lake City and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
its commitments to the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District is probably the largest commitment of any indus-
trial concern in Davis County. While the Town relied and 
now relies on Davis County for its fire protection, Salt Lake 
Refining Company at its own expense provided its own. 
Likewise this industry, wholly independent from the Town, 
built its own road into its premises and at its own expense 
maintains the same. It provides its own police protection 
and pays and discharges the cost of collection of garbage 
within its premises. Where in the Mammoth City case most 
of the mine employees lived within the city, here out of 277 
employees working in the disconnected territory only 2 
reside in the Town. In the Mammoth City case the city was 
dependent upon the mining premises for its existence. Here, 
if the disconnected territory remains outside the Town, 
78.61% of its assessed valuation, based on 1956 figures, will 
nevertheless be made up of industrial, commercial and public 
utility properties which is the highest percentage of such 
properties in the assessed valuation of any city or town 
within Davis County and compares with an average within 
such categories for all cities and towns of Davis County 
of only 42.86%. 
Thus it is seen that not only is there actually no rela-
tionship or dependency between the disconnected territory 
and the Town, but that the Town after severance of the 
territory involved will receive a larger percentage of its 
ad valorem tax revenues from industrial, commercial and 
public utility properties than any other city or town in 
Davis County. 
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Moreover, the Town by the annexation of April 21, 
1952, excluded from its boundaries the plant of Cudahy 
Packing Company, the Stock Yards area and the plants of 
Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder Company. 
If there were any community of interest between industry 
and the Town, it would be with these industries which are 
located at the very heart of the Town area, and which as 
the evidence shows are among the largest users of the Town 
post office. On the other hand, the activities of the discon-
nected territory are related primarily to Salt Lake City. 
From this municipality Salt Lake Refining Company has 
in the past procured its water supply. The public access 
road which this industry constructed and maintains at its 
expense connects directly with the streets of Salt Lake City, 
rather than with those of the Town. Its garbage is disposed 
of in Salt Lake City, and from the Salt Lake City post office 
both this Company and Salt Lake Pipe Line Company pro-
cure their mail. 
Surely none of the essential facts which led to the de-
cision in In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., supra, are 
here present and there is no interrelation or dependency 
between the disconnected territory and the Town. 
(e) The Health and Welfare of the Residents of 
the Town Do Not Require that the Discon-
nected Territory Remain a Part of the Town. 
There is some suggestion in the brief of the Town that 
its inhabitants are subjected to odors and fumes emanating 
from the plant of Salt Lake Refining Company. The evi-
dence on that subject was produced by Freda Wood, Town 
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Clerk of the Town, who, in response to a question of coun-
sel, stated as follows: "Well, usually about two o'clock in 
the morning they have some kind of a fume that comes out 
of their smoke stacks that has a sulfury-choking effect. 
It's usually noticeable more in the early hours of the morn-
ing than during the regular working hours, or easterly wind 
is just blowing our way at that time. The Western States, 
of course, also has quite a bit of polution. It would hit the 
higher areas more so than where I live, from the Western 
States Refinery, and the sewer ditch there. When there is 
a west wind coming up there, it's very bad at that time" 
(T. R. 1166-1167). The witness further stated: "We have 
quite a variety of smells out there. It depends on who is 
operating what" (T. R. 1166). And in the course of her testi-
mony she spoke of the odors arising from the Cudahy Ditch 
and the packing plant areas where, as indicated above, coun-
sel observed : "That's a pretty stinking place all the way 
around there." 
Turning to a consideration of these fumes and odors it 
is seen that they arise to a substantial degree from the open 
sewer canal of Salt Lake City. It is conceded that nothing 
can be done on this problem, pending the construction by 
Salt Lake City of a sewage treatment plant and the Town 
has so agreed (T. R. 1167). 
The principal source of fumes and odors is the packing 
plant--stock yards area and the Cudahy Ditch. 
We do not intend in this brief to disparage the opera-
tions of the Cudahy Packing Company, the Stock Yards, 
or any other industrial concern in the entire area under 
consideration. The Cudahy Packing Plant and the Stock 
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Yards have been located and operated in North Salt Lake 
for many years, long prior to the organization of the Town. 
The entire low land area wherein this plant and these yards 
are located has been zoned industrial by Davis County, and 
the Town has undertaken to classify the disconnected terri-
tory in the same manner. The operations of these concerns 
are being conducted within such classification, and we be-
lieve in an entirely lawful manner. We mean simply to 
point out that if the annexation of April 21, 1952, had in 
good faith been made for the purpose of controlling fumes 
and odors, the island area instead of being excluded would 
necessarily have been annexed to the Town. 
Considering the matter of oil refineries, there are four 
in the general area. Utah Oil is south of the Town; Phillips 
Petroleum is northerly of the Town; Western States is with-
in the Town, while Salt Lake Refining is westerly of the 
Town. If there be any air pollution from these industries, 
the situation is general to the Salt Lake industrial area and 
not related to any one refinery. There is no suggestion here 
that any of such refineries are operating in an unlawful 
manner; that the operations should be abated, restricted 
or curtailed, or that any measures should be taken against 
any of these industries by way of municipal regulation or 
control. On the contrary, this protracted ligitation stems 
primarily from the desire of the Town to keep this refinery 
within its boundaries. 
Nothing of any substance appears in this case which 
would justify a trier of the fact in finding that the health 
and welfare of the residents of the Town require retention 
of the disconnected territory, and the court below so found. 
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(f) The Decided Cases Sustain the Disconnection. 
The brief of the appellant cites the two Kentucky case~ 
of Collins v. Town of Crittenden, 70 S. W. 183, and Park: 
et al. v. Covington, 218 S. W. 986, and the South Dakota 
case of England v. Rapid City, 40 N. W. 2d 399. In each of 
these cases the lower court refused to decree disconnection 
and the appellate court sustained the decree. The rule in 
Kentucky appears to be that the findings of the trial court 
will not be disturbed if sustained by the evidence and a sim-
ilar rule appears to prevail in South Dakota. The Kentucky 
statute provides that upon the requisite petition the terri-
tory shall be disconnected unless the court shall find from 
the evidence that a failure to annex will materially retard 
the prosperity of the town and of the owners and inhabi-
tants of the territory involved. The South Dakota statute 
provides that the disconnection shall be granted if the court 
finds that it can be granted without injustice to the inhabi-
tants or persons interested. 
While the Kentucky and South Dakota statutes are not 
involved here, and the decision of those courts is not con-
trolling, an examination of the facts in each of those cases 
will demonstrate that those cases are readily distinguishable 
from the case at bar, and the decision of the trial court in 
each case may be sustained by application of the principles 
which we have heretofore considered and found to necessi-
tate the disconnection of the territory involved in the case 
at bar. 
We have examined all the disconnection cases which 
have come before this court under the statutes in question. 
They are Young, et al. v. Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 321, 67 
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Pac. 1066 (1902) ; Gilmor v. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 Pac. 932 
(1904); In re Fulmer, 33 Utah 43, 92 Pac. 768 (1907) ; 
Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah 455, 243 Pac. 
376 (1926); In re Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564, 262 Pac. 
105 (1927) ; In re Chief Consolidated Mining Company, et 
al., supra (1926) ; Plutus Mining Company v. Orme, et al., 
76 Utah 286, 289 Pac. 132 (1930); In re Peterson, 87 Utah 
144, 48 P. 2d 468 (1935) ; and Application of Peterson, 92 
Utah 212, 66 P. 2d 1195 (1937) ; Howard v. North Salt 
Lake, supra (1955). 
In Young v. Salt Lake City, supra, the trial court dis-
connected a parcel of land from Salt Lake City and this 
court affirmed. The allegations of the petition which the 
trial court found to be true were in substance that the land 
in question was not platted for any municipal purpose and 
was not situated so as to render it desirable to be platted 
for residents or business purposes; that the same was no 
part of the townsite entry of Salt Lake City; that it was 
situated five miles from the business portion of the city 
and two miles from the platted and inhabited part of the 
same; that lying between said land and the city was the 
Fort Douglas Military Reservation and the only way to 
reach the land was over said Reservation; that most of the 
property was situated north of Emigration Canyon along 
the foothills and mountain side and was mountainous, 
broken and unfit for residential purposes; that a range of 
foothills lay between it and the Reservation and that the 
land had never received or could receive any fire or police 
protection or other municipal benefits. 
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In Gilmor v. Dale, supra, a parcel of land had been 
disconnected from Salt Lake City and the case involved an 
action for the recovery of certain taxes paid under protest 
which had been levied upon the disconnected territory. The 
report does not disclose the allegations or findings of the 
court in connection with the disconnection proceedings 
which preceded the action for the recovery of the taxes paid 
under protest. 
In re Fulmer, supra, involved proceedings for the dis-
connection of certain territory from the town of Mapleton 
in Utah County. The trial court decreed disconnection and 
this court affirmed on the issue of justice and equity but 
reversed for further proceedings to adjust the terms upon 
which severance should be made. While the findings of 
the trial court do not appear from the decision this court 
in part stated : "The findings are amply supported by the 
evidence and it is quite clear that all of the territory sought 
to be detached consists of agricultural lands and receives 
no direct or appreciable benefit from being within the cor-
porate limits of the town of Mapleton." 
Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, supra, involved pro-
ceedings to disconnect about 681 acres from the corporate 
limits of Clearfield in Davis County. The area was segre-
gated by the trial court and this court affirmed. Complaint 
was made by the town that the findings of the trial court 
were not supported by the evidence, which contention this 
court held was not well founded. The contention was fur-
ther made by the town that the disconnected territory re-
ceived the same benefits as other premises within its boun-
daries. In affirming the decree, this court held that dis-
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connection was proper where no direct or appreciable bene-
fit was received regardless of such objection. 
In re Smithfield City, supra, presents a situation simi-
lar to the Clearfield case. Here the trial court disconnected 
under a finding that the detached area received no direct 
or appreciable benefit from being within the corporate lim-
its of the town and this court affirmed, the finding being 
based, as this court says, on amply supported evidence. 
Plutus Mining Company v. Orme, et al., supra, grows 
out of the case of In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., et al., 
supra, and involves the question of the liability of discon-
nected territory for the payment of taxes during the period 
of disconnection and prior to the reversal of judgment on 
appeal. The question of justice and equity is not involved 
in this case. 
In re Peterson, and Application of Peterson, supra, in-
volved proceedings for the disconnection of some 52.5 acres 
of land from the corporate limits of the town of Moab. In 
the first case, judgment was reversed by this court and the 
cause remanded for further proceedings. The facts were 
that the land in question was located on the western boun-
dary of the town. The party seeking disconnection had him-
self joined in the incorporation of the town of Moab and 
the inclusion therein of these premises which he sought 
later to disconnect. The land was agricultural in character, 
had never been used for any other purpose than to raise 
hay and other farm products, it had no residence on it 
except a small shack, the town had a sewer system and a 
waterworks system, both of which were constructed since 
the petition for severance was filed, the sewer was located 
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at too high an elevation to serve the severed lands, city 
water was available to the land but it could be more con-
veniently served from a privately owned system, the near-
est water fire hydrant maintained by the town was about 
a mile distant, the land was about a mile from the business 
section of the town, there was no paving or sidewalk or 
other improvements abutting or near the land although it 
did abut on an abandoned state highway which was being 
maintained by the town. Power and light services were 
available but these were furnished by a private concern 
and not by the town government. Disconnection was de-
creed by the trial court on the second hearing of the case 
and affirmed on appeal, this court saying: "We are satis-
fied the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported 
by the evidence and that neither the findings nor the decree 
should now be disturbed." The town contended that it 
would lose its income theretofore derived from taxation of 
the severed lands but this court held that this was not a 
sufficient reason to defeat the disconnection. 
In none of these cases where disconnection was decreed 
were the elements of justice and equity stronger than in 
the case at bar. Only in the Mamnwth City case (In re 
Chief Consolidated Mining Company) was the decree of 
disconnection reversed on the issue of justice and equity. 
The facts in that case, as we have shown, are so essentially 
different from those here presented, that the decision is not 
in any way controlling. 
So far as we are able to determine, only two states, 
Utah and Nebraska presently have statutes containing the 
"justice and equity" provisions. For this reason, we have 
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not cited cases on this point from outside jurisdictions 
other than Nebraska. A brief consideration of the Nebraska 
cases may, however, be helpful. 
The term "equity and justice" was construed in the 
case of Bisenius v. City of Randolph, 82 Neb. 520, 118 N. 
W. 127. This was an action to disconnect 200 acres of land 
from the city having more than 1,000 and less than 5,000 
population. The land was unplatted farm land and it was 
alleged that it received no benefits in common with the 
platted portion of defendant, and the land was retained in 
the city for revenue purposes. The statute provided, if the 
court find, "that justice and equity require such territory, 
or any part thereof, be disconnected from such city or 
territory, it shall enter a decree accordingly." The court 
held the statute constitutional, citing Young v. Salt Lake 
City and other cases, the statutes being essentially alike. 
In defining the term "justice and equity", the court 
says that the statutory section should be construed to mean 
"that whenever unplatted lands within the boundaries of, 
and adjacent to, the corporate limits of such city or village, 
are so situated that they do not have that unity of interest 
with the platted portion thereof (in the maintenance of 
village government), justice and equity dictate that they 
should be excluded therefrom." 
In Kuebler v. City of Kearney, 151 Neb. 698, 39 N. W. 
2d 415, the court says: 
"When an action is brought, either under a 
statute or at common law, to remove agricultural 
lands from within the corporate limits of a city or 
village, on the basis that justice and equity require 
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that it be disconnected therefrom, it is sufficient to 
show that the lands sought to be removed have no 
unity or community of interest with such city or 
village and receive few, if any, benefits by reason 
thereof." 
In Runyan v. Village of Ong, 154 Neb. 127, 47 N. W. 2d 
97, the court found that the facts were substantially as 
follows: Plaintiff's land was south of and adjoined the 
railroad right of way on the north. It was bounded on the 
west by a highway which is an extension of the main street 
of the village. The buildings on the property were 1000 
feet distant from any building in the direction of the village. 
The land not occupied by buildings was used as pasture. 
It was never platted or subdivided. The business section 
of the village was north of the railroad. No place of busi-
ness was south of the railroad. There were only three resi-
dences south of the railroad that were in the village limits 
and these were all on an east and west road %, mile south 
of the railroad. The population of the village was 190. 
There was no reason to foresee any extended growth. There 
was no tendency toward business or residence development 
south of the railroad. There were many vacant lots in the 
business section of the village and ample space for any con-
templated residential needs. There was evidence that the 
village had maintained the roads on the west and south of 
plaintiff's tract in conjunction with the township. There 
was a street light near the southwest corner of plaintiff's 
tract and another near the northwest corner. Electric 
energy was supplied to plaintiff's residence by the Con-
sumers Public Power District. The village maintained a 
volunteer fire department and a part time village marshal. 
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The police and fire protection afforded was negligible. It 
was plain from the record that the plaintiff's land received 
no more benefits from such protection than did adjoining 
agricultural lands not within the corporate limits of the 
village. The village had no water or sewer systems. No 
sidewalks has been built south of the tracks. The court said : 
"We think the evidence shows that the plain-
tiff's tract is rural in character and that its location 
makes it unfavorable for development as an integral 
part of the village. The evidence clearly shows there 
is no unity or community of interest between the 
property and the village. We fail to find any evi-
dence of any material benefit accruing to this land 
by reason of its being within the village. Conse-
quently we conclude that justice and equity require 
that it be disconnected from the village. * * *" 
Davidson v. City of Ravenna, 153 Neb. 652, 45 N. W. 
2d 7 41, involved a tract of 27 acres lying in the northeast 
corner of a city. It was used wholly for agricultural pur-
poses except for one residence in the southwest corner. The 
court said: 
"* * * The residence property is connected 
with the city water system and is furnished with 
electric lights from the Consumers Public Power 
District. The closest sewer line is one-half block 
west of the west line of the Hughes tract, the resi-
dence being about 150 feet east of the west boun-
dary. The closest fire hydrant is one block west of 
the southwest corner of the property. There is no 
street along the west side of the Hughes property ex-
cept for a very short distance at the south end. There 
is no demand for any part of the tract for residence 
lots or other city purposes. There is no evidence of the 
development or growth of the city in the general di-
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rection of this property. It is rural in character and 
its location appears unfavorable to its development 
as an integral part of the city. An examination of 
all of the evidence, including the photographs taken 
at various points on this acreage, convinces us that 
there is no community of interest between the prop-
erty and the city of Ravenna. While it is true that the 
property is benefited by receiving the benefits of 
city water and electric lights, this is not necessarily 
a controlling factor. Other properties outside of the 
corporate limits receive similar benefits. But, con-
sidered as a whole, justice and equity require that 
the Hughes tract be disconnected from the city. 
"* * * That part of the judgment denying 
relief to the plaintiffs Hughes is reversed and the 
cause remanded to the District Court with instruc-
tions to disconnect the Hughes property * * * 
from the City of Ravenna." 
In Village of Hartington v. Luge, et al., 33 Neb. 624, 50 
N. W. 957, the village annexed certain lands and under a 
statute brought an action against the landowners of the 
area annexed to have the court confirm the annexation. It 
was alleged that the annexation was made for the purposes 
of protection from fire, preservation of health, order, and 
cleanliness of said village and for the purpose of raising the 
revenue or taxes to help defray the expenses of said village, 
and that said ends would in justice and equity require the 
annexation of said territory to said village. It was further 
alleged that other material benefits and advantages besides 
those mentioned would be derived from such annexation by 
reason of said territory lying across and obstructing the 
approach and egress of the public and the citizens of said 
village to and from said village to the public highways ad-
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jacent to said territory. The statute provided that if the 
court found that the territory would "receive material bene-
fit by its annexation, or that justice and equity require such 
annexation of said territory," then a decree should be made 
accordingly. The trial court decreed annexation. The 
Supreme Court reversed the same saying in part: 
"* * * The facts stated in the petition do 
not bring the case within the provisions of the stat-
ute. It does not appear that the property sought to 
be annexed would be benefited in any manner what-
ever, nor that justice and equity require such an-
nexation. The principal benefit would be to the vil-
lage by adding to the taxable property therein, but 
this, of itself, is not sufficient. If this action could 
be sustained upon the facts pleaded and proved, then 
the village might annex a whole township or county, 
as such an annexation could be placed upon the same 
grounds as it is sought to predicate this action upon. 
* * * It is not the policy of the law to bring 
large tracts of agricultural land within a municipal 
corporation. In fact there is an inconsistency in do-
ing so. The territory of a municipal corporation is 
ordinarily subdivided into lots and blocks, and the 
residents thereon are not supposed to obtain a liveli-
hood by the cultivation of the soil. Where it is 
necessary, therefore, to extend the village limits to 
obtain more lots or land that should be divided into 
lots, an action of this kind may be sustained. But 
it cannot be sustained unless the statutory grounds 
exist." 
The foregoing Utah and Nebraska decisions set forth 
the principles which should guide and control a trial court 
in the determination of the issue of justice and equity under 
our statute. These principles, we believe, are all embodied 
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in the propositions which we have considered under the 
foregoing subdivisions of this brief. They constitute the 
foundation upon which the findings of the trial court were 
made. These findings are fully supported by the evidence 
and sustain the conclusions and decree of disconnection. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in this case demonstrate that no direct or 
special benefit of any substance was received by the dis-
connected territory by the exercise of the powers of the 
Town; that the future growth and expansion of the Town 
will not require the disconnected territory nor is it neces-
sary for the use of the Town ; that there is no interrelation 
or dependency between the disconnected territory and the 
Town; and that the health and welfare of the residents of 
the Town do not require that the disconnected territory 
remain a part of the Town. 
The trial court in hearings had before two judges has 
twice found that justice and equity require the severance. 
The decided cases sustain this result. 
If the disconnection is denied the territory involved 
will be required, on a basis of 1956 valuations, to pay 
61.86% of all ad valorem taxes imposed by the Town. This 
fact compels the conclusion of the trial court that the resist-
ance of the Town to the disconnection of the territory in-
volved stems from a desire for revenue. This is not enough 
to justify the annexation. See In re Peterson, supra; Appli-
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cation of Peterson, supra; McKeon v. Council Bluffs (Iowa), 
221 N. W. 351, Anno: 62 A. L. R. 1041. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WESLEY G. HOWELL, 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
Assistant City Attorney, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
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